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Power-based Behaviors in Supply Chains and Their Effects on Relational Satisfaction: 




Although the sources of a firm’s power vis-à-vis upstream and downstream relationships in 
supply chains have been studied extensively, how a firm may act or react to power-based 
behaviors of its partners has not been sufficiently defined and discussed. To this end, we 
present three power-based behaviors: dominance, egalitarian, and submissive. From a cross-
disciplinary reading of the relevant literature, we conceptualize and discuss the characteristics 
of these behaviors as manifested by dyads within supply chains. Three power-based behaviors 
are proposed to describe both initiating and responding behaviors used by partners, with these 
behaviors affecting relational satisfaction. This results in nine potential descriptors of the state 
of any supply chain relationship. We then discuss the opportunities to use our approach to 
better research the dynamics of power in supply chain relationships. 
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Firms employ various means to utilize relationships for competitive advantage by accessing, 
integrating, and leveraging external resources (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Within this realm, the 
importance of supply chain relationships for business is apparent. There are at least 28 review 
articles addressing various forms of interorganizational relationships (Parmigiani & Rivera-
Santos, 2011), and a recent meta-analysis of interorganizational relationships included 149 
empirical studies representing 33,051 relationships (Cao & Lumineau, 2015). Relationships 
are relevant across a myriad of relationship forms, including alliances, joint ventures, supply 
agreements, cross-sector partnerships, networks, and consortia (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 
2011). We focus specifically on supply chain relationships. 
“Supply chain scholars have devoted much attention to interorganizational 
relationships,” focusing on both contractual and relational governance (Cao & Lumineau, 
2015, p. 15). In the present study, we attend to relational governance, which has been 
delineated as trust and relational norms. These norms are “shared expectations about the 
behaviors of each party” (Cao & Lumineau, 2015, p. 17). Specifically, we consider the effects 
of power-based behaviors on relational outcomes. Firms’ behaviors toward their business 
partners vary in the direction, extent, and approach that power is exerted (Ganesan, 1993; 
Hingley, 2005; Meehan & Wright, 2013). Firms’ choices of behaviors and strategies are 
affected by one another’s capabilities and perceptions of power symmetry/asymmetry and 
dependence in embedded relationships (Bastl, Johnson, & Choi, 2013; Nyaga et al., 2013; 
Tate, Ellram, & Gölgeci, 2013). Each firm’s strategy to wield and respond to power affects 
the evolution and outcomes of dyadic relationships. Some firms dominate their partners by 
demanding conformance. Other firms stress equitability, seeking to engage in shared problem 
solving and compromise. Still other firms focus on accommodation and compliance to 
partner’ expectations. This interplay of action and reaction between partners shapes and 
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reshapes supply chain relationships (Hingley, 2005), ultimately leading to relational 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction. 
The discourse on power has persistently revolved around the power construct in terms 
of its sources, bases, and forms (Benton & Maloni, 2005; Cowan, Paswan, & Van Steenburg, 
2015; Gaski, 1984; Leonidou, Talias, & Leonidou, 2008; Turker, 2014), often focusing on the 
wielders of power (Cox, 2001; Gaski, 1984; Hingley, 2005; Hunt & Nevin, 1974). Over time, 
the language has become quite familiar. Well-worn terms include coercive and noncoercive 
power forms (Hunt & Nevin, 1974) and exercised and unexercised power sources (Gaski & 
Nevin, 1985), with effects of power on various outcomes including conflict (Lusch, 1976) 
and, notably, satisfaction (Benton & Maloni, 2005; Lai, 2007), which are often discussed.   
The large and ever-growing body of power and dependence literature provides crucial 
understandings of how partners influence and/or react to one another. It could be felt that 
power research has run its course, with little remaining to be investigated. Even so, Bastl et 
al. (2013), Nyaga et al. (2013), and Sturm and Antonakis (2015), among others, continue to 
speak of the importance of gaining a greater understanding of this pervasive and complex 
phenomenon affecting supply chain relationships. Thus, in addition to earlier calls for the 
need to better understand the nature of behaviors associated with the exercise of and response 
to power in supply chain relationships (Benton & Maloni, 2005; Hingley, 2005), there 
remains a need for more studies related to the types of interaction between partners (Nyaga et 
al., 2013). We go further and observe that there is a deficit in the literature on the role of 
power in supply chain relationships, in that it focuses on power only as a construct that is an 
antecedent position or a factor in manifesting a supply chain behavior such as opportunism 
(Johnston et al., 2004).  
Perspectives on power and dependence found in supply chain management and 
channels of distribution literature, as well as negotiations (specifically, the dual concern 
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model, Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993), lead us to propose that using the terms dominance, 
egalitarianism, and submissiveness and their potential effects on relational satisfaction is an 
effective way to frame the discourse. The relevance of relational satisfaction is apparent as it 
affects interfirm functioning in meeting customer needs (Benton & Maloni, 2005) and supply 
chain performance. This is not to dismiss other outcomes, ranging from cohesiveness 
(Kabanoff, 1991), to cooperation (Bonoma, 1976), to conflict (Lusch, 1976), among others. 
However, here we focus on relational satisfaction as it has often been viewed as a pivotal 
reflection of the success of relationships. 
In sum, we contribute to the literature on supply chain relationships by introducing the 
three power-based behaviors and discussing how partners may use these as initiating and 
response behaviors. We present the argument that power is a complex set of behaviors in of 
itself that should have its own descriptive language. This provides richer insights as to why 
firms in supply chain relationships encounter the problems and opportunities when working 
together. In addition, we provide expectations as to why combinations of these behaviors by 
supply chain partners with varying sources of power and dependence result in different 
effects on relational satisfaction. By doing so, we advance the literature by describing the 
power-based behavioral choices available to dyads within supply chains and explaining 
behaviors and conditions through which firms may use power in expected or unexpected 
ways.   
Next, relevant theoretical background related to power and dependence is provided. 
With this as a basis, we define and discuss the three power-based behavioral archetypes: 
dominance, egalitarian, and submissive behaviors. These behaviors are discussed in a 
framework depicting nine pairings of the initiating and response behaviors and the anticipated 
effects of these combinations on relational satisfaction. We conclude with implications for 
supply chain relationships while giving scholars several ideas for future research.  
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2. Theoretical background of power/dependence in business dyads 
Following foundational works by French and Raven (1959) and Emerson (1962), power and 
dependence were recognized as core elements affecting behaviors in interorganizational 
relationships. As Emerson aptly claimed, the ability of a firm to have power over another 
partly relies on the dependence a partner has on it. It has spawned valuable theory, including 
the resource dependence theory, whose basis rests on the realization that “central to (actions 
taken to reduce uncertainty and dependence) is the concept of power, which is the control 
over vital resources” (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009, p. 1404). The supply chain and 
channels literature follows in this tradition, with numerous conceptual and empirical works 
attesting that power and dependency are important constructs in describing the behavior of 
transacting firms (e.g., Ireland & Webb, 2007).  
Power is an innately relational concept (Zhao et al., 2016). Sturm and Antonakis 
(2015, p. 139) provide an apt definition of power as “having the discretion and the means to 
asymmetrically enforce one’s will over entities.” Supply chain partners are influenced by the 
effects of exercised coercive and noncoercive power sources by a partner (Hunt & Nevin, 
1974) and by perceptions of the other partner’s power position even if power sources are not 
exercised (Gaski, 1984; Hingley, 2005). Consistent with past literature (Heide & John, 1988; 
Scheer, Miao, & Palmatier, 2015), dependence plays an important role in our 
conceptualization of how power-based behaviors are chosen by supply chain partners. In the 
present study, dependence is defined as the extent to which one partner needs the other for its 
business purposes (Scheer et al., 2015), which is driven by scarcity such as the number of 
available alternative partners with the requisite skills, products, and or services. Power-
dependence dynamics have an effect on supply chain partner’ actions/responses, including the 
granting of rewards and/or inflicting punishments (Leonidou et al., 2008), along with 
decisions to submit to, resist, or reject partner’ behaviors. Thus, the dependence positions of 
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partners are among the key factors in supply chains, affecting choices of power-based 
behaviors and responses to these behaviors.   
For power-based behaviors to matter to a supply chain dyad, relationships must move 
beyond the spot market, where price is a major consideration and the firm maintains “arm’s 
length” (cf. Dyer & Singh, 1998) links by having several suppliers/customers as near-
equivalents for business needs. At the same time, once relationships have moved even slightly 
past the spot market, and there is any element of asset specificity, relative power/dependence 
affects dominance, egalitarian, and acquiescence tendencies between the parties. Throughout 
this paper, we use the term supply chain partners. In so doing, we are focused on dyads within 
a supply chain, and we use the Benton and Maloni’s (2005) perspective that “emphasize a 
direct, long-term association” (p. 3). 
The following discussion is particularly relevant in the actions and reactions by supply 
chain partners in early stage relationships as partners are establishing power/dependence-
based norms of behavior toward one another through learning loops. This is the time that a 
firm lacks history as to how their partner tends to initiate and respond to behaviors. Over 
time, the actions and reactions of partners lead to behavioral norms which, in turn, facilitate 
or erode the functioning of the dyad. There is also relevance for established relationships 
since, consistent with the complexity view (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997) and contingency 
theory (Flynn, Huo, & Zhao, 2010), behaviors are emergent and relative power/dependence 
changes. The fact is that, through time, events conspire to lead supply chain partners to make 
demands on one another that may or may not be consistent with norms for the dyad.   
The important point to note when motivating the need for taxonomy of power-based 
behaviors is that power and dependency can shift between a buyer and supplier over time. For 
example, in the supply chain literature, a bargaining position for negotiating a dyadic 
relationship may change for the better or worse over time (Autry & Golicic, 2010). The 
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relationship between partners may change from a state of locked-in dependency to one of a 
more open commitment (Narasimhan et al., 2009). To chart the transitions for each partner 
requires a vocabulary of behaviors that is nuanced in reflecting both sides of the buyer–
supplier relationship.  
Next, we discuss the concepts central to our updated way of perceiving power-based 
behaviors and their effects on supply chain relationships. We posit that dominance, 
egalitarian, and submissive behaviors are three major interconnected yet distinct power-based 
behavioral archetypes that supply chain partners apply to each other as means of expressing 
and responding to power.   
3. Power-based behaviors and relational satisfaction 
3.1. The three power-based behaviors 
Cooperative strategies and interorganizational relationships have attracted substantial 
attention in management research (Börjeson, 2015; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Powell, Koput, & 
Smith-Doerr, 1996; Turker, 2014; Vlaar, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006). Firms perform 
different interorganizational behaviors often as part of their cooperative strategies when 
engaging with their business partners during the course of their relationships (Vandaele et al., 
2007). In this research, we examine power-based behaviors as a specific type of 
interorganizational behaviors. There are facilitating factors that tend to provoke the usage of 
each of the power-based behaviors. Additionally, there are tendencies in the nature of 
interfirm interaction accompanying the use of each behavior. These are summarized in Table 
1 and discussed below. 
------------------ Insert Table 1 Here ------------------ 
3.1.1. Dominance behavior  
Dominance behavior relates to actions taken with the intent of compelling a partner to act in 
the firm interests unilaterally. Engaging in dominance behavior is a tendency when a supply 
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chain partner expects its partner to comply, often with an expressed or implicit implication 
that failure to comply will have adverse consequences. Though dominance behavior could be 
driven by motives such as strategic positioning and sociopolitical needs that are not directly 
linked to possession of power, the firm’s power position in a dyad influences the decision to 
exert dominance (Cox, 2001). Firms may possess various power advantages, giving them the 
means to use behaviors to assert influence over a partner. For instance, when dependence is 
imbalanced among partners, the less dependent firm may tend to act more assertively, secure 
in its knowledge that the more dependent partner will be likely to acquiesce to expectations. 
Further, the less dependent partner may be unconcerned about the effects of its behavior on 
the more dependent partner’s perception of their relationship (Emerson, 1962; Heide & John, 
1988; Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995a). As these thoughts suggest, the more dependent 
partner can feel compelled to act in abeyance to dominance behavior (Caniëls & Gelderman, 
2007). Intriguingly, a firm can perform dominance behavior even if it is lacking sufficient 
power sources to justify the behavior or assure that response will be as expected.  
Anticipating the possible actions and reactions by supply chain partners is aided by 
concepts from the dual concern model (e.g., Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Rhoades & Carnevale, 
1999). Developed for negotiations, the model asserts that a lack of concern for others while 
having a high concern for the self can lead to contentious behaviors. The model offers the 
motivational orientations affecting strategies by parties. Rhoades and Carnevale (1999) 
related further that “combinations of these concerns predict the strategies that negotiators will 
choose in a particular circumstance.” (p. 1778). Consistent with this reasoning, a partner may 
choose dominance behaviors when it perceives it has available power to do so, has a 




In the instance of a lack of concern for the other, the more powerful partner may tend 
toward authoritarianism expecting that the partner will be submissive to its demands. The 
behaviors used by the aggressively dominating party tend to be coercive power forms (Hunt 
& Nevin, 1974), attesting to the “discretion and the means to asymmetrically enforce one’s 
will” over the other party in an overt and contentious way (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015, p. 139). 
The dual concern model suggests that responses to these aggressive behaviors may either 
match or mismatch. Matching can arise when a partner firm believes that it has sufficient 
countervailing power or, despite lacking countervailing power, that the dominating partner 
needs to be resisted to assure fairness or protect the firm interest. In either case, 
contentiousness rises in the dyad. Mismatching arises when the response is a submissive 
power-based response.  
Alternatively, a tendency toward dominance may be motivated by the desire to win 
over a partner in both actions and spirit. In these situations, the dominating partner believes 
that their leadership will assure win–win outcomes. This tendency might occur when a firm’s 
priority is monitoring and controlling commercial, operational, and strategic issues (Meehan 
& Wright, 2013) so as to assure efficiency and reliability (Cameron & Quinn, 2011) amicably 
within the dyad. Here, the intent might be far removed from that of an authoritarian or bully, 
with amicable dominance behavior forms chosen, i.e., subtle and courteous exercise of 
noncoercive power such as reward or expertise (Hunt & Nevin, 1974), out of a self-certainty 
that power is sufficient to cause partners to willingly conform in anticipation of win–win 
outcomes. Amicable dominance behaviors are reflected most closely in conditions where 
there is a concern for self and concern for the partner, resulting in problem-solving behaviors. 
Although a tendency for the dominant supply chain partner is to direct the other partner, when 
done amicably, these dominance behaviors may be acceptable, even appreciated, because the 
dominant partner is seen as legitimately guiding the dyad’s success.  
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The intentions of the initiator can be misunderstood by the responder. For instance, 
amicable intentions in applying dominance behavior may be perceived by the recipient 
partner as aggressive dominance. To avoid such relationship harming perceptions and 
misunderstandings (Vlaar et al., 2006), performers of amicable dominance behavior can work 
to assure that partners perceive them as having legitimate orchestration capability, i.e., the 
capability to influence the beliefs, goals, and behavior of other key partners (Möller & Svahn, 
2003). Therefore, firms aspiring to industry leadership have worked to foster a reputation for 
orchestrating entire supply chains, such that potential partners will trust in their expertise to 
lead the relationship. When a business partner is seen by the other as having orchestration 
capability, dominance behavior may more likely be viewed as amicable, opening the door for 
more positive outcomes for both partners in a dyad (Möller & Svahn, 2003). 
3.1.2. Egalitarian behavior 
Egalitarian behavior denotes a greater degree of reciprocity, equitability, and compromise 
between the parties and bilateral management of a relationship. Egalitarian behavior consists 
of activities by a business partner that demonstrates that they feel that their partner has equal 
worth and social status. Across definitions, equality is paramount, encouraging behaviors 
where people are treated as equals and related to as equals (Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy). As such, even if one or both of the firms may have the means to use dominating 
forms of power, their preference is to behave as equals. The dual concern model recognizes 
that concern for self may be accompanied by concern for the other (Rhoades & Carnevale, 
1999), leading to egalitarian tendencies, including a willingness to compromise, collaborate, 
and co-manage the relationship, with equitable sharing of relational rents. Equity is achieved 
between partners through exhibiting qualities such as reliability and forbearance of 




Symmetrical dependence discourages partners from trying to assume a dominant role 
over the other (Cox, 2001; Levina & Vaast, 2008) and encourages mutual compromise to 
achieve mutually desirable outcomes. As this implies, egalitarian behavior encourages 
cohesion, reciprocity, and synergy between the parties, as well as autonomy and openness as 
key ingredients of innovation (Harryson, Dudkowski, & Stern, 2008; Levina & Vaast, 2008). 
Open innovation platforms are often established on egalitarian principles where different 
ideas are tolerated and every participant is treated respectably so as to spur openness and 
synergistic accumulation of innovation (Albors, Ramos, & Hervas, 2008). Thus, a key ability 
that is intertwined egalitarian behavior is equitability, referring to the ability wherein both 
parties to feel they are treated fairly over a period of time (Leonidou et al., 2008). The 
perception that a business partner is concerned, respectful, and willing to exchange ideas with 
the other partner constitutes underlying mechanisms of relational satisfaction (Lai, 2007), and 
equitability can help build such perception.  
Egalitarian behavior fits well in situations where partners expect relational returns 
over longer periods of time and in a sustained fashion (Börjeson, 2015). While relationships 
where egalitarian behavior are exercised are not always conflict free, firms performing 
egalitarian behavior can leverage conflicts as innovative input for continued value creation, 
instead of trying to avoid it. For example, undeterred by its relative size and power, Nokia 
practices egalitarian behavior, offering openness, flexibility, and autonomy in its 
collaborations. These actions attracted the best partners. They, in turn, volunteer the best of 
their in-house expertise (Ketchen, Ireland, & Snow, 2007). In short, regardless of their 
dependence positions, partners can often improve relational satisfaction by mutually adopting 
egalitarian behavior. 
3.1.3. Submissive behavior 
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Submissive behavior is conformity to the requirements of a partner. Submissive behaviors are 
actions that are adaptive, accommodating, and conforming to requirements as set by a 
business partner. It places the compliant partner primarily in the position of an acquiescent 
partner using obliging and yielding behaviors (Bonoma, 1976) to achieve concord between 
the parties. When a firm realizes that it is more dependent and/or lacking in countervailing 
power, it is more likely to choose submissive behavior in response to a partner’s demands 
(Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). Moreover, as suggested by the dual concern model, submissive 
behavior is more likely to be performed when there is a prevailing concern for the other 
partner (Rhoades & Carnevale, 1999). Finally, when a firm has developed adaptive 
capability, referring to the ability to coordinate, recombine, and allocate resources to meet 
business partners’ demands and proposals (Lu et al., 2009), it may be more receptive to 
submissive behavior; this may even be a purposeful part of the submitting partner’s strategy 
for relationship development. 
We offer two primary forms of submissive behavior, willing submissiveness and 
resentful submissiveness. Willing submissiveness is characterized by having an intrinsic 
motivation and low to zero resistance to the requirements of the demanding partner. 
Alternatively, resentful submissiveness is characterized by feeling compelled to submit while 
simultaneously desiring—but feeling unable—to resist the demands of the partner. Willing 
submissive behavior tends to be the result of a partner having decided that compliance is 
consistent with their intent for the firm, congruent with expectations for the relationship or 
legitimate because of contract or tacit acknowledgment of the partner being a channel captain.  
When a partner feels compelled to submit to demands despite a desire to resist, 
submissive behavior can lead to resentment. For instance, a category champion such as 
Rubbermaid may feel that a partner such as Walmart should view it as an equal, with 
egalitarian behaviors following. However, should Walmart choose to exert dominance 
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behaviors on Rubbermaid, the need to submit soon becomes apparent. This leads a weaker 
partner to acquiescence, despite doing so grudgingly or with resentment. The ensuing damage 
to relational satisfaction can be accompanied by a submissive partner taking steps to shift the 
power balance, whether by forming coalitions to counterbalance its dominant partner’s power 
advantage (Bastl et al., 2013) or striving to identify alternative partners. 
3.2. Relational satisfaction 
It should come as no surprise that an effective relationship is considered productive, 
rewarding, and satisfactory (Athanasopoulou, 2009). But what constitutes effectiveness? 
There are numerous relational outcomes that reflect effectiveness including cohesiveness, 
cooperation, commitment, and trust, with few grievances and little conflict (Benton & 
Maloni, 2005; Scheer et al., 2015). Yet another important outcome is relational satisfaction. 
We define relational satisfaction as a positive affective state resulting from an appraisal of a 
firm's relationship with another (Frazier, 1983), with qualities including an appreciation for 
and enjoyment in the relationship with its partner (Lai, 2007). Relational satisfaction is a key 
enabler of other relational outcomes such as trust, continuity, and loyalty (Flint, Blocker, & 
Boutin Jr, 2011). When partners have high relational satisfaction, they feel that the 
relationship is fulfilling and gratifying (Geyskens & Steenkamp, 2000) which, in turn, 
cascades to other positive outcomes including financial and operational performance 
(Athanasopoulou, 2009). Similarly, Lai (2007) found that firms that are economically and 
socially satisfied with their partners perform better. Similar to the results of Autry and 
Golicic’s (2010) study, there is likely a feedback loop between relationship strength 
(exhibited through satisfaction) and performance over time where supply chain partner’ 
relationships “spiral” upward or downward, driven by the effects of initiating and responding 
power-based behaviors in dyads.   
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Preferably, relational satisfaction is experienced by both parties, reflected in partners 
sharing favorable sentiment toward one another and with each valuing the relationship. 
However, relational satisfaction is firm specific, with the possibility that one firm is satisfied 
while the other may be dissatisfied with the relationship (Mullins et al., 2014). In this 
research, we are interested in economic and noneconomic mutual satisfaction of business 
partners accumulated across all transactions. Although it could be believed that performance 
induces relational satisfaction, it may be the nature of the buyer–supplier relationship that 
drives satisfaction more than performance (Benton & Maloni, 2005). This is yet another 
reason why it is imperative to understand the behaviors affecting relational satisfaction 
between partners. 
3.3. Expectations on power-based behaviors and relational satisfaction 
In the preceding discussion of the three power-based behaviors, a number of expectations 
have already been suggested. We encapsulate a range of initiating and response behaviors and 
expected outcomes of these behaviors in Table 2. Each of the nine cells in the table presents 
research opportunities. 
------------------ Insert Table 2 Here ------------------ 
3.3.1. Dominance behaviors used by initiator and power-based responses (Cells 1,2,3) 
A supply chain partner seeking to exert control over the behaviors of its partner may choose 
dominance behavior to compel submissive behavior. When a submissive response follows, 
the relationship can be affected in healthy or destructive ways (Cell 3). As a healthy example, 
a partner might view the dominance behavior as legitimate and amicable, like when the 
initiator is recognized as a channel captain exerting dominance for the good of the dyad or 
entire supply chain. Here, the initiating firm’s dependence is often lower than the partner 
firm’s dependence, and both parties are cognizant—and accepting—of the power held by the 
initiator. Indeed, channel captains are often recognized as having leadership capabilities and 
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resources that can be geared toward partners for mutual success, with captains often either 
assuming risk or taking the lead (Defee et al., 2009) to create win–win outcomes. Toyota and 
its relationships with its partners represent this form of dominance/willing submissiveness by 
exercising an experience-based and capability-based leadership and providing financial and 
technical resources and training to its partners to support this position. Toyota’s partners 
recognize that compliance and subordination will likely improve their performance. Willing 
submissive behavior will likely follow an initiating firm’s dominance behavior when the 
corresponding partner values the relationship, views its partner’s power source as legitimate, 
and feels that its partner is exerting dominance behavior amicably, such as by using its 
orchestration capabilities. The outcome of this condition would be relatively high relational 
satisfaction. 
Alternatively, perceptions of aggressive dominance behavior can lead a partner to feel 
forced to submit to demands, resulting in grievances toward its dominating partner and 
reduced relational satisfaction. As suggested earlier, besides adverse effects on relational 
satisfaction, dominance behavior as a part of contentious strategies against partners can 
reduce relational cohesiveness (Kabanoff, 1991) and increase overt or covert conflict (Lai, 
2007).  
Instead of willingly or resentfully submitting to demands by the dominant partner, the 
corresponding partner may perform matching responses such as applying countervailing 
power (Cell 1). As suggested by the dual concern model, these matching strategies can be 
problematic for the well-being of the dyad because these behaviors result in greater 
contentiousness between parties (Rhoades & Carnevale, 1999) and the likelihood that the 
parties become confrontational (Gaski, 1984). For example, a control-oriented firm like 
Walmart, which is able to maintain a position of low dependence relative to suppliers, tends 
to exercise dominance behavior. Some suppliers, especially category leaders in their 
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respective fields, may instinctively engage in dominance behaviors in response. As the 
tensions between the two build, the category leader may find itself possessing a revised 
realization about its sources of power, along with becoming a resentful yielder to Walmart. 
Resentful yielding likely leads to lower relational satisfaction. Additional outcomes from this 
kind of contentious situation include deterioration of interfirm functioning, with adverse 
effects on communication quality and performance. 
Finally, following an initiator’s dominance behavior, the responding partner might 
exert egalitarian behavior (Cell 2). Here, the responding partner may be expectant/hopeful 
that the initiator will step away from their initial dominant posture, providing opportunity for 
shared problem solving and negotiated decisions. This strategy, while not as contentious as 
using dominance behaviors in reply, is nonetheless inconsistent with the initiator’s 
expectations, potentially creating unease and compelling the initiator to respond more 
forcefully with its initial expectations/demands. However, an increase in contentiousness 
following egalitarian response seems more likely when the initiator has used aggressive 
dominance behaviors. This is because the initiator of amicable dominance behavior tends 
toward benevolence, possibly leading them to be more receptive to the responder’s efforts to 
bring suggestions into the discussion rather than merely acquiescing to the demands made by 
the initiator. 
3.3.2. Egalitarian behaviors used by initiator and power-based responses (Cells 4,5,6) 
Cell 5 represents the condition where both the initiating partner and responding partner 
engage in egalitarian behavior. Egalitarian behavior is associated with collaborative, 
participative, and equitable relationships (Powell et al., 1996) where synergies are prioritized, 
a better fit between resources or capabilities and characteristics of business partners are 
achieved, and benefit/cost ratios of each partner are alike. Enabling each other to behave on 
more-or-less equal grounds regardless of relative power or dependence mutually enhances 
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partners’ efficacy, provides more space for autonomy (Langfred, 2005), and has often more 
favorable outcomes than playing “carrot-and-stick games” (Puranam, Gulati, & Bhattacharya, 
2013) that accompany dominance and submissive behaviors. Likewise, fairness, a key 
attribute of egalitarian behavior, plays a positive role in relational satisfaction (Kumar, 
Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995b). Because of being equitable, performers of egalitarian behavior 
are more likely to achieve a good fit between resources or capabilities and characteristics of 
business partners that is argued to be a precondition for effective cooperation (Antolin-Lopez 
et al., 2015). Some might even argue that the feeling of equity among partners regardless of 
power imbalances is essential for satisfaction (Benton & Maloni, 2005).  
Shared egalitarian behavior (Cell 5) seems most likely to be present in the power-
based initiating and response behavior patterns of partners with offsetting or complementary 
power sources and symmetrical dependence. Under these conditions, supply chain partners 
tend to abstain from exercising offensive or nonproductive behaviors (Heide & John, 1988; 
Kumar et al., 1995a), with symmetrical power/dependence also discouraging partners from 
trying to assume a dominant role over the other (Cox, 2001; Levina & Vaast, 2008). Balance 
also encourages mutual compromise to achieve mutually desirable outcomes. Thus, 
egalitarian behaviors become the natural tendency for symmetrically dependent partners who 
then work jointly to formulate joint strategies and activities (Bonoma, 1976) to assure good 
performance. For example, autonomy and collaboration are two key mottos of W.L. Gore, a 
firm renowned for its egalitarian approach to doing business. A supply chain relationship 
established on this ground with a like-minded partner is likely to produce positive relational 
satisfaction.  
The actions of partners when they have asymmetrical power/dependence are less 
certain as the partner with more power/less dependence can choose dominance (Cell 4) or 
egalitarian (Cell 5) behaviors in response to the egalitarian behaviors of the initiator. A 
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partner possessing power advantage does not necessarily yield dominance behaviors toward 
weaker and more dependent others. The dual concern model recognizes that concern for self, 
accompanied by concern for the other, tends to lead to egalitarian tendencies. So, the stronger 
partner might respond with egalitarian behaviors despite being capable of dominating the 
partner. Interestingly, evolutionary research suggests that stronger individuals are limited in 
their predispositions to exploit weaker individuals for their own gain because the latter can 
refuse offers while waiting for alternative offers from less dominant prospects (Debove, 
Baumard, & André, 2015). Using this logic, egalitarian behaviors initiated by a stronger 
supply chain partner need not be out of concern for the other partner. Instead, it can be a self-
serving realization that pushing the weaker partner too hard might lead the weaker partner to 
withdraw. 
Relationships may suffer if only one partner adopts egalitarian behavior while the 
other responds with dominance (Cell 4) or submissive (Cell 6) behavior in response. For 
instance, Lego, a toy manufacturer, prioritizes egalitarian relationships including creative and 
proactive collaboration with partners (Antorini, Muñiz Jr, & Askildsen, 2012). Thus, Lego 
may be dissatisfied with both dominance-minded partners that seek to dictate exchange terms 
or pliant ones that constantly expect directions rather than engaging in proactive and 
symmetrical collaboration. Such power-based behavior misfits between partners would tend 
to create cognitive dissonance and discomfort in exchange activities that may lead to 
weakening relational satisfaction because a partner initiating with egalitarian behavior 
expects egalitarian behavior from the corresponding partner. 
3.3.3. Submissive behaviors used by initiator and power-based responses (Cells 7,8,9) 
Though not as common as some of the conditions already discussed, there can be situations 
where submissive behavior is performed as an initiating behavior. For example, a component 
supplier with small market share or relatively unknown to the market may seek out well-
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known “trophy/reference” original equipment manufacturer (OEM) customers as coaches for 
its development and leverage them as a springboard to grow its market share. In such cases, a 
supplier may initiate the relationship with submissive behavior inviting amicable dominance 
behavior by the prospective partner (Cell 7). Performers of such willing submissive behavior 
will be prepared to invest heavily in their relationships to please their dominant partners. For 
example, Sun Ray, a technology firm with its technology lacking significant differentiation 
from its major competitors, may seek reference customers to boost its market credibility and 
tout its magnificence (Välikangas, Hoegl, & Gibbert, 2009). Firms such as Sun Ray are likely 
to apply submissive behavior to win over such reference customers as their existence gives 
potential other customers confidence that the product or service is cutting-edge, dependable, 
and well-supported. The prospective partners’ response to submissive behavior might be 
either aggressive or amicable dominance behavior. If the responding partner chooses 
aggressive dominance behavior, the submissive partner might be “put off,” feeling that the 
partner has not reciprocated in a respectful manner (Grover et al., 2014), leading them to 
rethink whether entering into the relationship is a good idea. However, if the responding 
partner gets away with their aggressive dominance behavior response, i.e., compelling the 
partner to submit to their demands, it could easily lead to resentment and lower relational 
satisfaction. 
It is also possible that the initiator of submissive behaviors does so resentfully. This 
may occur in situations where an initiator, already in a relationship with characteristics of 
higher dependence and a lack of countervailing power, has been intimidated by the partner’s 
reputation or past encounters with it. The initiator, possibly bearing resentments from past 
encounters but dependent on the relationship, may use anticipatory submissive behaviors so 
as to pre-emptively appease the stronger partner, feeling that doing so will soften tendencies 
for aggressive behaviors from it (Cell 7).   
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Additional responses to an initiator’s use of submissive behavior are egalitarian (Cell 
8) or submissive (Cell 9) behaviors. For instance, a weaker partner may feel obligated to work 
with stronger partners, expressing itself to the partner with expressions such as “tell us 
whatever we need to do” or “we are prepared to take whatever steps are necessary to grow 
with you.” A stronger partner such as Lego, preferring cooperative engaged relationships, 
may reply with egalitarian behavior (Cell 8). If its partner uses this as a positive opportunity 
and shifts to egalitarian response behaviors, then high relational satisfaction could result. 
However, if it never quite feels comfortable working as equals (reflected in Cell 5), relational 
satisfaction could be somewhat lower. Finally, though seemingly far less likely, initiated 
submissive behavior could be followed with a response of submissive response behavior (Cell 
9). In this situation, each partner may believe that they are more dependent on the other. If 
this happens, the initiator’s submissive behavior would be awkward and confusing for the 
responding partner. In turn, the partner’s response might be to respond with their own 
willingness to bend to the wishes of the partner. An awkward and unsatisfying relationship 
would result. Generally, it seems that submissive–submissive (Cell 9) is unlikely, although if 
occurring, it would be dysfunctional and associated with low relational satisfaction. 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
Despite an extensive and lengthy history of research on power and dependence, there have 
been several recent calls for greater understanding of these pervasive concepts affecting 
partner’ behaviors and relationships (Bastl et al., 2013; Nyaga et al., 2013). We respond to 
these calls by providing a framework to describe power-based behaviors as they evolve in 
supply chain relationships. We introduce new terms of dominance, egalitarian, and 
submissive behaviors and describe the potential effects of these behaviors on relational 
satisfaction between supply chain partners. We endeavor to offer a vocabulary that is relevant 
to both buyers and suppliers anywhere along supply chains, from raw material and 
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component suppliers to final assemblers and from warehouses or distribution centers to 
retailers. Their decisions and responses to the decisions of partners signal the state of 
cooperation and therefore warrant a means of expressing the resulting balance of power in the 
relationship. Our conceptualization, with insights across the nine cells of initiating and 
response behaviors, makes several multidisciplinary contributions to theory, along with 
managerial implications. 
4.1. Contributions and opportunities for further research  
There are numerous behavioral issues relevant to power that the extensive power literature 
has not fully addressed (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015), not least of which are the complex 
interactions occurring between business partners and the effects of these interactions on 
outcomes. We use existing power concepts including power sources, along with dependence 
to introduce and discuss various combinations of power-based initiating and response 
behaviors by partners (dominance, egalitarian, and submissive behaviors) within supply 
chains. Our discussion elaborates the likely effects of combinations of these conditions and 
behaviors on a crucial supply chain relationship outcome, relational satisfaction. By doing so, 
we advance theory on power by developing concepts for interorganizational behaviors that 
are based on power enactment as an underlying force. By interactively accounting for power-
based behaviors of both partner firms, we draw a realistic picture of the dynamics associated 
with these behaviors and their likely effects on the relationship between supply chain 
partners. 
The description of the various potential combinations of these behaviors (Table 2) 
provides a tool for better research on supply chain relationships. For example in the design 
and analysis of multiple case studies in both survey and qualitative research into supply chain 
transformation, a before-and-after snap shot of power-based behaviors between partners 
would be one way to gauge causes of changes in relational outcomes. In research on 
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improvement within relationships, we would expect to be able to describe the supporting 
changes in the relationship using the descriptions of power-based behaviors. Dyads found in 
particular cells tend to become norms for enduring supply chain partner relationships, while 
other cells tend toward terminated relationships. The use of relational satisfaction as a 
construct to summarize many of the metrics of supply chain improvement would be 
important. In research questions focused on the evolution of an industry, our power 
relationships may describe more accurately the evolving relationships between firms as there 
is consolidation amongst suppliers, often as a result of increased market concentration at any 
level in a supply chain. For example, how much of the impact of the market leadership of 
firms such as Walmart and Amazon can be described in terms of changes in their power 
relationship with their suppliers up the supply chain.   
Change over the time in supply relationships underscores the need for a dynamic 
versus static view of power. The belief that managers can change supply chain relationships 
by their actions is an assumption that needs to be challenged with solid longitudinal research. 
If so, what factors enable or disable a manager’s ability to move their firms from one set of 
power-based behaviors to another. For instance, partners might have egalitarian behavior 
norms disrupted by events such as product failure or late shipments, leading to new behaviors 
(aggressive dominance by the aggrieved and submissiveness by the partner responsible for 
the event). It would be intriguing to learn whether disruptive events lead to new norms or 
simply anomalies in behaviors. As this suggests, a full understanding of how partners engage 
in power-based behaviors in relative power/dependence contexts will only be possible as 
researchers account for temporal dynamics and feedback loops during the lifetime of 
relationships (Nyaga et al., 2013), including disruptive events on norms in partner behaviors. 
Thus, longitudinal studies are encouraged to enrich our understanding. 
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There can be differences between intent and received perceptions when power-based 
behaviors are used by an initiating partner. Divergence in perceptions, behaviors, and 
relational outcomes is often inevitable in the evolution of supply chain relationships (Autry & 
Golicic, 2010; Mullins et al., 2014). Thus, developing models that explicate how supply chain 
partners engage behaviors while exploring how the intent is perceived is an exciting area for 
researchers. It is also important to conduct research focused on the range of responses 
represented by submissive behavior and the effects of these responses on relational 
satisfaction. Here, we introduce willing and resentful submissiveness. Each of these is quite a 
different reaction by a partner, with expectations of different effects on outcomes.  
In a similar vein, it is possible that the responding partner, besides complying with the 
expectations of the initiating partner, could use avoidance behavior. In such circumstances, 
feigning dominance, egalitarian, or submissive behavior could be an alternative. For example, 
a partner can appease the dominating partner by making assertions such as “no problem,” 
“sure,” or “things will be taken care of.” However, if feigning, these assertions are not 
followed with action. This is particularly germane when working with suppliers from cultures 
that tend to avoid saying “no,” preferring deflection over directness when uncomfortable 
responses are the alternative. Likewise, a partner may feign egalitarian behavior to fit in the 
partnership norms, though they may not act in a genuinely equitable way. Meanwhile, 
avoidance could be a response by any partner from any culture. This occurs when a demand is 
received but with no response returned to the partner. In this regard, the nonresponding firm 
can seek to avoid behavior change while hoping that their partner will not repeat particular 
expectations. These possibilities are in line with the recent scholarly attention to feigning 
and/or misleading behaviors in dyads (e.g., Börjeson, 2015; Grover et al., 2014). 
Although several relationship outcome variables are mentioned, we primarily focused 
on relational satisfaction as a critically important outcome of the supply chain power-based 
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behaviors and responses of partners. However, this is just one among numerous outcome 
variables that should be included in the future research, including multiple forms of social 
capital (Villena, Revilla, & Choi, 2011).  
Researchers have the additional opportunity to explicate antecedents and the 
moderating/mediating mechanisms entwined with power-based behaviors. In particular, how 
firms’ overall cultural values may lead to (in)appropriate exercise of power resulting in 
low(high) relational satisfaction is not clear. Drawing on Cameron and Quinn (2011), we 
know that firms are subject to competing values that must be reconciled in behaviors. For 
example, the desire for control versus openness within a firm may create a predilection for 
dominant, egalitarian, or submissive power-based behaviors with their partners. Similarly, if a 
firm has a climate for cooperation as supported by its cultural values (Johnston & Kristal, 
2008), then the power-based behaviors by employees of the firm are expected to be aligned 
with these values. Thus, the influence of cultural values on power-based behaviors entails 
further research. 
 There are limits to our framework due to our conscious choice to constrain our focus 
to dyadic supply chain relationships. First, we do not discuss the ways that actions taken in 
dyads send signals to other members of supply chains outside a focal dyad, thereby affecting 
decisions and behaviors of other parties across extended networks. Pathak, Wu, and Johnston 
(2014) pointed out the importance of brokerage by third parties that can change the dynamics 
among two partner firms. Triadic relationships (Bastl et al., 2013) imply that power in dyads 
is influenced by interactions with a partner’s competitors who also may have in turn a 
relationship with the firm. Applying our framework across other interorganizational forms 
such as alliances, joint ventures, supply agreements, licensing, co-branding, franchising, 
cross-sector partnerships, networks, trade associations, and consortia (Parmigiani & Rivera-
Santos, 2011) may also be useful. Second, the signaling effects of behaviors within a dyad 
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may be observed by competitors, particularly those sharing common suppliers and customers 
(Pathak et al., 2014), affecting the power-based behaviors chosen by these actors as well. 
Finally, we recognize that power-based behaviors are ultimately manifested by individuals 
representing their firms (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015). The implication being that individuals’ 
behavior may be at variance with a firm’s policies and relationship norms with partners. 
4.2. Managerial implications 
Our study informs several management practices. First, it illustrates key characteristics of 
power-based behavioral archetypes that firms exercise and incorporate in their policies while 
developing relationships with their partners. Policy makers and managers are normally 
interested in actual behavior that could be linked to power (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015). In 
other words, managers appreciate a language that speaks to them in terms that are reflective 
of how power is a means to their ends, the end being satisfying relationships with partner 
firms that support the design and execution of effective business interactions. We offer a 
matrix of initiating power-based behaviors, likely power-based partner responses, and the 
resultant effects on relational satisfaction (Table 2). Some combinations of initiating and 
responding power-based behaviors can lead to high relational satisfaction, with others 
resulting in low satisfaction. However, choosing behaviors that lead to a preferred relational 
outcome can be difficult to achieve, given that each partner may see their relative dependence 
differently and feel that the other will adjust their perceptions and resultant power-based 
behaviors when faced with particular power-based behaviors by their partner. As such, there 
is no one best power-based behavior for all situations. Relational satisfaction is contingent 
upon the interplay between power-based behaviors and perceptions of the relative dependence 
positions of both partners. 
Given their behavioral dynamics, power-based behaviors are intricate and contingent 
on the setting in which they occur. Thus, managing power successfully in a business 
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relationship is partly a function of reading the context correctly. If firms read the context right 
and adopt the proper power strategy, then they should be able to expect satisfying 
relationships. Given the current interest in developing emotional intelligence (Goleman, 
2006) and its derivatives such as cultural intelligence among managers, nurturing cognition 
about relationships and how they are affected by various dominance, egalitarian, and 
submissive behaviors between partners may be critical for successful boundary-spanning 
managers. 
The dynamics of power-based behaviors have many of the attributes of a complex 
adaptive system (Pathak et al., 2007). Whether using dominance, egalitarian, or submissive 
behavior, actions taken by one partner signals to the other, eliciting a response. The signaling 
back and forth results in an adaptive learning loop. While managers strive for stability in their 
supply chain relationships, any of a number of factors can destabilize their situation for better 
or worse, triggering the need to adapt and learn. Competitors entering or exiting a market or 
technological change, or even a disruptor such as missed delivery dates or failed quality tests 
of shipped goods, may dramatically shake the equilibrium, thereby causing a rapid and 
significant change in power-based behaviors adopted by supply chain partners. For example, 
if a partner in a symmetrically balanced power/dependence dyad that has traditionally been 
using reciprocating egalitarian power-based behaviors receives a shipment of parts that fails 
inspection, the firm may opt to use dominance behavior to force a rapid submission response 
by its partner (e.g., immediate parts replacement; financial recovery). More broadly, in times 
where a business partner faces “force majeure”-like incident(s), the responding partner may 
be compelled to tolerate sudden changes in the partner’s behavior until s/he knows as to 
whether the relationship is experiencing the noise of singular events versus a systemic change 




Albors, J., Ramos, J. C., & Hervas, J. L. (2008). New learning network paradigms: Communities of 
objectives, crowdsourcing, wikis and open source. International Journal of Information 
Management, 28(3), 194-202. 
Antolin-Lopez, R., Martinez-del-Rio, J., Cespedes-Lorente, J. J., & Perez-Valls, M. (2015). The 
choice of suitable cooperation partners for product innovation: Differences between new 
ventures and established companies. European Management Journal, 33(6), 472-484. 
Antorini, Y. M., Muñiz Jr, A. M., & Askildsen, T. (2012). Collaborating with customer communities: 
Lessons from the lego group. MIT Sloan Management Review, 53(3), 73. 
Athanasopoulou, P. (2009). Relationship quality: A critical literature review and research agenda. 
European Journal of Marketing, 43(5/6), 583-610. 
Autry, C. W., & Golicic, S. L. (2010). Evaluating buyer–supplier relationship–performance spirals: A 
longitudinal study. Journal of Operations Management, 28(2), 87-100. 
Bastl, M., Johnson, M., & Choi, T. Y. (2013). Who’s seeking whom? Coalition behavior of a weaker 
player in buyer – supplier relationships. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 49(1), 8-28. 
Benton, W., & Maloni, M. (2005). The influence of power driven buyer/seller relationships on supply 
chain satisfaction. Journal of Operations Management, 23(1), 1-22. 
Bonoma, T. (1976). Conflict, cooperation and trust in three power systems. Behavioral Science, 21(6), 
499-514. 
Börjeson, L. (2015). Interorganizational situations – an explorative typology. European Management 
Journal, 33(3), 191-200. 
Brown, S. L., & Eisenhardt, K. M. (1997). The art of continuous change: Linking complexity theory 
and time-paced evolution in relentlessly shifting organizations. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 42(1), 1-34. 
Cameron, K. S., & Quinn, R. E. (2011). Diagnosing and changing organizational culture: Based on 
the competing values framework. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Caniëls, M. C., & Gelderman, C. J. (2007). Power and interdependence in buyer supplier 
relationships: A purchasing portfolio approach. Industrial Marketing Management, 36(2), 
219-229. 
Cao, Z., & Lumineau, F. (2015). Revisiting the interplay between contractual and relational 
governance: A qualitative and meta-analytic investigation. Journal of Operations 
Management, 33, 15-42. 
Cowan, K., Paswan, A. K., & Van Steenburg, E. (2015). When inter-firm relationship benefits 
mitigate power asymmetry. Industrial Marketing Management, 48, 140-148. 
Cox, A. (2001). Understanding buyer and supplier power: A framework for procurement and supply 
competence. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 37(2), 8-15. 
Debove, S., Baumard, N., & André, J. B. (2015). Evolution of equal division among unequal partners. 
Evolution, 69(2), 561-569. 
Defee, C., Stank, T., Esper, T., & Mentzer, J. (2009). The role of followers in supply chains. Journal 
of Business Logistics, 30(2), 65-84. 
Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. (1998). The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of 
interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(4), 660-679. 
Emerson, R. M. (1962). Power-dependence relations. American Sociological Review, 27(1), 31-41. 
Flint, D. J., Blocker, C. P., & Boutin Jr, P. J. (2011). Customer value anticipation, customer 
satisfaction and loyalty: An empirical examination. Industrial Marketing Management, 40(2), 
219-230. 
Flynn, B. B., Huo, B., & Zhao, X. (2010). The impact of supply chain integration on performance: A 
contingency and configuration approach. Journal of Operations Management, 28(1), 58-71. 
Frazier, G. L. (1983). On the measurement of interfirm power in channels of distribution. Journal of 
marketing Research, 20(2), 158-166. 
French, J. R. P., & Raven, B. (1959). The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright (Ed.), Studies in 
social power (pp. 150-167): University of Michigan Press. 
Ganesan, S. (1993). Negotiation strategies and the nature of channel relationships. Journal of 
marketing Research, 30(2), 183-203. 
27 
 
Gaski, J. F. (1984). The theory of power and conflict in channels of distribution. Journal of 
Marketing, 48(3), 9-29. 
Gaski, J. F., & Nevin, J. R. (1985). The differential effects of exercised and unexercised power 
sources in a marketing channel. Journal of marketing Research, 22(2), 130-142. 
Geyskens, I., & Steenkamp, J.-B. E. (2000). Economic and social satisfaction: Measurement and 
relevance to marketing channel relationships. Journal of Retailing, 76(1), 11-32. 
Goleman, D. (2006). Emotional intelligence. Why it can matter more than iq (10th ed.). London, UK: 
Random House Publishing Group. 
Grover, S. L., Hasel, M. C., Manville, C., & Serrano-Archimi, C. (2014). Follower reactions to leader 
trust violations: A grounded theory of violation types, likelihood of recovery, and recovery 
process. European Management Journal, 32(5), 689-702. 
Harryson, S. J., Dudkowski, R., & Stern, A. (2008). Transformation networks in innovation alliances–
the development of volvo c70. Journal of Management Studies, 45(4), 745-773. 
Heide, J. B., & John, G. (1988). The role of dependence balancing in safeguarding transaction-specific 
assets in conventional channels. Journal of Marketing, 52(1), 20-35. 
Hillman, A. J., Withers, M. C., & Collins, B. J. (2009). Resource dependence theory: A review. 
Journal of Management, 35(6), 1404-1427. 
Hingley, M. K. (2005). Power to all our friends? Living with imbalance in supplier–retailer 
relationships. Industrial Marketing Management, 34(8), 848-858. 
Hunt, S., & Nevin, J. (1974). Power in a channel of distribution: Sources and consequences. Journal 
of marketing Research, 11(2), 186-193. 
Ireland, R. D., & Webb, J. W. (2007). A multi-theoretic perspective on trust and power in strategic 
supply chains. Journal of Operations Management, 25(2), 482-497. 
Johnston, D. A., & Kristal, M. M. (2008). The climate for co-operation: Buyer-supplier beliefs and 
behavior. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 28(9), 875-898. 
Johnston, D. A., McCutcheon, D. M., Stuart, F. I., & Kerwood, H. (2004). Effects of supplier trust on 
performance of cooperative supplier relationships. Journal of Operations Management, 22(1), 
23-38. 
Kabanoff, B. (1991). Equity, equality, power, and conflict. Academy of Management Review, 16(2), 
416-441. 
Ketchen, D. J., Ireland, R. D., & Snow, C. C. (2007). Strategic entrepreneurship, collaborative 
innovation, and wealth creation. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 1(3‐4), 371-385. 
Kumar, N., Scheer, L. K., & Steenkamp, J. B. E. M. (1995a). The effects of perceived 
interdependence on dealer attitudes. Journal of marketing Research, 32(3), 348-356. 
Kumar, N., Scheer, L. K., & Steenkamp, J. B. E. M. (1995b). The effects of supplier fairness on 
vulnerable resellers. Journal of marketing Research, 32(1), 54-65. 
Lai, C.-S. (2007). The effects of influence strategies on dealer satisfaction and performance in taiwan's 
motor industry. Industrial Marketing Management, 36(4), 518-527. 
Langfred, C. W. (2005). Autonomy and performance in teams: The multilevel moderating effect of 
task interdependence. Journal of Management, 31(4), 513-529. 
Leonidou, L. C., Talias, M. A., & Leonidou, C. N. (2008). Exercised power as a driver of trust and 
commitment in cross-border industrial buyer–seller relationships. Industrial Marketing 
Management, 37(1), 92-103. 
Levina, N., & Vaast, E. (2008). Innovating or doing as told status differences and overlapping 
boundaries in offshore collaboration. MIS Quarterly, 33(2), 307-332. 
Lu, Y., Zhou, L., Bruton, G., & Li, W. (2009). Capabilities as a mediator linking resources and the 
international performance of entrepreneurial firms in an emerging economy. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 41(3), 419-436. 
Lusch, R. (1976). Sources of power: Their impact on intrachannel conflict. Journal of marketing 
Research, 13(4), 382-390. 
Meehan, J., & Wright, G. H. (2013). Power priorities in buyer–seller relationships: A comparative 
analysis. Industrial Marketing Management, 42(8), 1245-1254. 




Mullins, R. R., Ahearne, M., Lam, S. K., Hall, Z. R., & Boichuk, J. P. (2014). Know your customer: 
How salesperson perceptions of customer relationship quality form and influence account 
profitability. Journal of Marketing, 78(6), 38-58. 
Narasimhan, R., Nair, A., Griffith, D. A., Arlbjørn, J. S., & Bendoly, E. (2009). Lock-in situations in 
supply chains: A social exchange theoretic study of sourcing arrangements in buyer–supplier 
relationships. Journal of Operations Management, 27(5), 374-389. 
Nyaga, G. N., Lynch, D. F., Marshall, D., & Ambrose, E. (2013). Power asymmetry, adaptation and 
collaboration in dyadic relationships involving a powerful partner. Journal of Supply Chain 
Management, 49(3), 42-65. 
Parmigiani, A., & Rivera-Santos, M. (2011). Clearing a path through the forest: A meta-review of 
interorganizational relationships. Journal of Management, 37(4), 1108-1136. 
Pathak, S. D., Day, J. M., Nair, A., Sawaya, W. J., & Kristal, M. M. (2007). Complexity and 
adaptivity in supply networks: Building supply network theory using a complex adaptive 
systems perspective. Decision Sciences, 38(4), 547-580. 
Pathak, S. D., Wu, Z., & Johnston, D. (2014). Toward a structural view of co-opetition in supply 
networks. Journal of Operations Management, 32(5), 254-267. 
Powell, W. W., Koput, K. W., & Smith-Doerr, L. (1996). Interorganizational collaboration and the 
locus of innovation: Networks of learning in biotechnology. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 41(1), 116-145. 
Pruitt, D. G., & Carnevale, P. J. (1993). Negotiation in social conflict. Buckingham, UK: Open 
University Press. 
Puranam, P., Gulati, R., & Bhattacharya, S. (2013). How much to make and how much to buy? An 
analysis of optimal plural sourcing strategies. Strategic Management Journal, 34(10), 1145-
1161. 
Rhoades, J. A., & Carnevale, P. J. (1999). The behavioral context of strategic choice in negotiation: A 
test of the dual concern model. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 29(9), 1777-1802. 
Scheer, L. K., Miao, C. F., & Palmatier, R. W. (2015). Dependence and interdependence in marketing 
relationships: Meta-analytic insights. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 43(6), 
694-712. 
Sturm, R. E., & Antonakis, J. (2015). Interpersonal power: A review, critique, and research agenda. 
Journal of Management, 41(1), 136-163. 
Tate, W. L., Ellram, L. M., & Gölgeci, I. (2013). Diffusion of environmental business practices: A 
network approach. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 19(4), 264-275. 
Turker, D. (2014). Analyzing relational sources of power at the interorganizational communication 
system. European Management Journal, 32(3), 509-517. 
Välikangas, L., Hoegl, M., & Gibbert, M. (2009). Why learning from failure isn’t easy (and what to 
do about it): Innovation trauma at sun microsystems. European Management Journal, 27(4), 
225-233. 
Vandaele, D., Rangarajan, D., Gemmel, P., & Lievens, A. (2007). How to govern business services 
exchanges: Contractual and relational issues. International Journal of Management Reviews, 
9(3), 237-258. 
Villena, V. H., Revilla, E., & Choi, T. Y. (2011). The dark side of buyer–supplier relationships: A 
social capital perspective. Journal of Operations Management, 29(6), 561-576. 
Vlaar, P. W., Van den Bosch, F. A., & Volberda, H. W. (2006). Coping with problems of 
understanding in interorganizational relationships: Using formalization as a means to make 
sense. Organization studies, 27(11), 1617-1638. 
Zhao, X., Shang, Y., Lin, J., Tan, J., Li, H., & Liu, T. (2016). Leader's relational power: Concept, 















Facilitating factor     
Power position of the 
firm 
Advantage Equal  Disadvantage (Bastl et al., 2013; Cox, 2001) 
Dependence position of 
the firm 
Low High or low High (Emerson, 1962; Heide & John, 
1988; Kumar et al., 1995a) 
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Matching can result in tensions due 
to tendencies toward 
contentiousness.  Relational 
satisfaction likely to be low. 
Aggressive 
Particularly damaging and tension 
filled, especially if initiator was 
aggressive. Damaging matching 
cycle can result. Relational 
satisfaction likely to be quite low 
and short lived unless one of the 
partners changes to submissive. 
Relative cognitive and 
behavioral mismatch 
between the initiating and 
responding partner likely to 
arise.  Relational 
satisfaction likely to be 
low, especially if 
dominance is exercised 
aggressively. 
Willing 
Both parties pleased with outcome, 
with behaviors seen as appropriate 
Relational satisfaction likely to be 
higher when initiator uses amicable 
approach.  
Resentful  
Responding partner troubled with 
relationship.  Low relational 
satisfaction, especially following 
aggressive dominance by partner. 
 
















   
Amicable 
Initiator somewhat discouraged by 
response while tending to accept 
partner’s nonthreatening approach. 
Relational satisfaction moderate. 
Aggressive 
Initiator “surprised” by response. 
Tensions result, with initiator 
forced to submit or respond with 
dominance. Relational satisfaction 
is relatively low. 
Considered positive for 
each partner. Creates 
synergistic and equitable 
relationship. Relational 
satisfaction likely to be 
high. 
Willing 
Responding partner may find it 
comfortable to have initiator state 
expectations. Awkward for each 
partner, with mediocre relational 
satisfaction.  
Resentful 
Unlikely submissive response as 























As initiator presents itself as 
willingly submissive, amicable and 
constructive dominance response is 
healthy. Relational satisfaction 
likely to be moderate to high. 
Aggressive 
Initiator may be puzzled with 
response of dominance, likely to 
become resentful. Relational 
satisfaction likely to be low. 
May cause the initiator to 
be puzzled because 
egalitarian behavior could 
be contrary to the 
expectation of amicable 
dominance behavior as 
response. Relational 
satisfaction likely to be 
middling. 
Willing 
Awkward as neither partner takes 
the lead in the dyad. Partners may 
each be disappointed in the other’s 
actions as each wants the other to 
take charge. Low relational 
satisfactions likely. 
Resentful  
Not generally an issue 
 
 
 
 
 
